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ABSTRACT
This paper exanined the bonus and wage behavior in Korea.
We found that both bonuses and wages in Korea respond to economic
conditions much more than their counterparts in Japan. This
finding may reflect the fact that the Korean labor niarket is niuch
closer to a spot market rather than a long—term contract
(lifetime employment) niarket. Hence the bonus/wage ratio is
apparently insensitive to economic conditions in Korea, unlike in
Japan (Freemand and Weitzinan). When "overtime" coniponent of the
wage is separately examined, it responds to econoniic conditions
less than bonuses but more than base wages.
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1. Introduction
This paper establishes stylized facts on the degree of bonuses and
overtime payments in total compensations, and their sensitivities with
respect to economic conditions in Korea. Results are compared, when
possible, to those in Japan.
Motivation for this paper is three-fold. First, a bonus system in
Japan has been studied in the context of a "share economy' in a series of
papers by Weitzman. Among other findings, movements of the bonus-wage ratio
in Japan are positively correlated with profits, and other economic perfor-
mance variables, which is taken to be an evidence for profit-aharing. Korea,
coo, has a bonus system, although bonuses are paid four times a year in
Korea as opposed to twice a year in Japan. The bonus portion of total
compensation in Korea is still low compared to Japan, but rising very
quickly.
Weitzman (1986) and Freeman and Weitzman (1987) examined a hypothesis
that bonuses in Japan play a role of profit sharing proposed by Weitzman
(1984). Freeman and Weitzman showed, among others, that the Japanese bonus
is much more sensitive to economic conditions, such as profits and value
added, than the base wage. Thus, some of unexpected profits are distributed
as bonuses to workers, that is the idea of profit sharing. We will examine
the same hypothesis for Korea.
Second, overtime wages are examined as an alternative flexible part of
workers' compensation. Some remain skeptical about the flexibility of
bonuses with respect to economic conditions, despite the work by Freeman and
Weitzman, in which overtime payments are not separated from base wage
payments. A major portion of bonuses are negotiated in annual labor
negotiation [Shunto]. Thus, a source of flexible wages responding to
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economic conditions is not bonuses but flexible overtime hours and payments.
The overtime pay may automatically adjust workers' compensation depending on
firms' profitability.
Third, a comparative study of Korea and Japan may be cast in a much
larger framework of search for an East Asian model for economic growth. In
the 1960s and 1970s, the Japanese miracle of rapid economic growth prompted
a scrutiny on the Japanese economy, emphasizing its difference from a
western, neoclassical model)- Recently, a miracle of rapid economic growth
has been repeated by other Asian neighbors, such as Korea and Taiwan. A
search for comnon ingredients, such as bonuses, for rapid economic growth
leads to a comparative study of Japan and Korea.2
Recently, a comparison of the Korean and Japanese labor market have
become popular; Ono (1989) compares the aspect of seniority wage and Ahn
(1982) examines the aspect of lifetime employment. Ono (1989) finds that
"age" is a better explanatory variable than the length of experiences,
internal and external to the current employer, both in Japan and Korea.
Ono's analysis using microdata of the both countries is a valuable
contribution. He tries to measure major determinants of wages by regressing
the wage on schooling, internal and external experiences, age, size-of-
employer dummy variables. The finding supports the idea of a seniority wage
structure in both countries. Ono gives an interpretation, beyond just a
confirmation of "seniority structure." He concludes that the wage is
deternined for "life security needs't (subsistence) of the household, that
varies with age. However, finding a high R2for a model including age does
not necessarily discriminate the subsistence wage hypothesis from other
explanations.
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There is one seminal work toward a test of the profit sharing
hypothesis in Korea. Joon W. Kim (1988) attempted to apply the Freeman and
Wettzman model to the Korean data. He concludes from his studies with
manufacturing sectoral data that bonuses are more responsive to profits (and
other economic performance variables) than wages. We have improved over
Kim's results. First, his data set unfortunately had missing observations
in 1973 and 1982, which we have filled. Second, we have applied various
tests related to the hypothesis other than the one attempted by Kim. Third,
we explicitly test both in Japan and Korea that the flexibility of bonuses
relative to overtime pay which is known to play a role of slack adjustment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Next section will be
an overview of the Korean labor market. In Section 3, econometric tests
developed by Freeman and Weitzman will be applied to the comparable Korean
data. Section 4 will examine the flexibility of overtime compensations, as
opposed to bonuses, using both Korean and Japanese data. The last section
will summarize the findings of this paper.
2. Korean Labor Market: An Overview
(i) Mobility.
The workers' mobility in Korea is currently much higher than that of
Japan. However, the average length of the service, the quit rate (by age and
by size of the firm) and other indicators in the present Korea are quite
comparable to the situation in Japan of the 1920s and 1930s, when lifetime
employment system started to become popular among skilled workers in the
booming industries, according to Ahn (1982). For example, the five-year
average separation rate in Korea between 1975 and 1979 was 5.2%, while that
in Japan between 1924 and 1928 was 4.7%. From this evidence and others, Ahn
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suggests that Korea may be ready to adopt a lifetime employment aystem.
High mobility of Korean workers is also documented by Soonkon Kim (1983)
During the 1970s, the separation rate in Korea was on average at 5%, while
it was 1.5% in Japan and a little over 4% in the United States (Kim (1983;
p.3)). In 1979, 68.4 percent of workers had a tenure less than 10 years;
31.4 percent between 10 and 20 years; and only 0.2 percent had a tenure more
than 20 years (Kim (1983; p.6)). Kim (1983; p.13) concludes that "Korean
employers have not yet developed seniority-related welfare benefit programs
designed to prevent high turnover.'
(ii) Bonuses
Next, let us establish how prevalent bonuses are in Korea. The
significance of bonuses in total compensations can be measured in the
bonus/(monthly wage) ratio. Figure 1 shows the time-series of the amount of
bonuses (for a year) in equivalent of (monthly) wages.4 It shows that the
bonus-wage ratio in Korea has increased rapidly and it is about the same
level with that of Japan in late 1950s. The Japanese experiences show that
the bonus-wage ratio had increased during its "rapid growth period," but has
declined since the first oil crisis of 1973-74. The casual reading of
trends shown in this graph suggests that the bonus-wage ratio increases
while the economy enjoys rapid, and probably more than expected, growth.
However, how bonus responds to temporal economic fluctuations around the
trend should be examined carefully.
Table 1 shows the sectoral decomposition of the bonus/wage ratio in
Korea. It is clearly observed that bonus ratios of different sectors move
together, presumably in a procyclical fashion. However, the range of
sectoral numbers is quite wide.
Insert Figure 1 about here
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Next, in order to establish that not only top managers but also blue-
collar workers have received bonuses, we have to look at how many of the
workers receive them. In 197], more than 90 percent of all workers in
manufacturing sectors received some types of bonuses. Moreover, 70.5% of
production workers and 72.3 percent of office workers received bonuses at
scheduled months, while about 7 percent received occasional bunuses and
about 13 percent receive both scheduled and occasional bonuses. (See Ahn
(1982; section 9.4) This implies that bonus payment is a wide-spread
institution.
(iii) Reasons for bonuses -- a survey
Next, let us examine whether there is an established view on why
bonuses are paid in Korea. In a survey of reasons for giving bonuses, cited
in Ahn (1982; p.250), a supplement to workers' life (needs in living
condition) is a majority.5 Profit sharing is not at all (except for 6.3%
for the medium-size firms) recognized as a reason for bonuses. A decision
for giving bonuses is mainly made unilaterally by the employer (62%), while
some of them (26%) are negotiated at the time of annual labor negotiations
(Ahn (1982; p.251).
If these results are taken at the face value, bonuses are a result of
unilateral benevolence by employers in order to give a supplemental income
to workers who suffer from poor living conditions. In particular, "profit
sharing" is not at all credited in the literature as a reason of handing out
bonuses. This description seems to be far from a profit sharing hypothesis
envisioned by Weitzman.
However, a bonues-as-benevolence hypothesis, indicated by the above-
mentioned survey (and also Ono (1979)), may contradict with other facts in
the survey. Regularly-paid bonuses must be expected by employees. If
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workers expect bonuses to be paid four times a year, it would be hard to
unilaterally skip one, unless employees receive a good explanation, such as
an operating deficit or a negative profit. Moreover, paternalistic
employers may afford benevolence only when they earn more than enough. In
sum, findings tn survey resuLts may provide no definite answer with respect
to the nature of bonuses. Only a careful empirical analysis answering a
following question can give a more informed reasoning. Are bonuses (or the
bonus/wage ratio) sensitive to corporate profits, even if it may not
consciously recognized by employers?
(iv) Historical Origin.
About the historical origin of bonuses in Korea, there are only
speculations. While some sustpect that the Japanese firms brought the
practice of bonuses during the occupation era (1910-1945), some think that
bonuses are a traditional idea in Korea: "If [bonuses] were a result of the
Japanese influence, it would be difficult to explain how quickly the [bonus
system spread after the independence." (Ahn (1982, p. 247)) Moreover,
bonuses are paid twice a year in Japan and four times a year in Korea; and
it was only after the Second World War that the Japanese firms (in Japan)
broadened bonus payments to blue-collar workers, and sharply increased
the wage-bonus ratio as the economy enjoyed the sustained high-speed growth
as shown in Figure 1. Therefore, we tend to think that the Korean bonus
system has developed independently from the Japanese influence. We could
not find, at present, any other writings, as to how wide spread bonuses were
among Korean firms prior to the Japanese occupation.
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3. Analysis of Bonuses in Korea
(i) Definitions
First of all, some terminologies are defined. First, annual payments
(total compensations) are divided into two parts, bonuses and monthly wages.
"Monthly wages" are defined as contractual payments that are regularly paid
every month [that is, "Kimatte Shikyu Sareru Kyuyo" in Japanese] used in
Freeman and Weitznian. Note that this definition includes overtime pay.
"Bonuses" are special payments that are not included in monthly wages.6
Second, monthly wages can be divided into "wage base," [Shotei naij and
Thvertime pay" [Shotel gal]. An overtime premium in Korea and Japan is
about 25%, as opposed to 50% in the United States. Definitions and data
concerning bonuses, wages and employment in Korea and in Japan are quite
comparable. In the rest of this section, wages" means "monthly wages,"
including "overtime pay."
(ii) Economic Fluctuations and Bonuses
Weitzman (1986) and Freeman and Weitzman (1987) found that in Japan
bonuses respond to profits more than wages, suggesting that bonuses play a
mechanism of profit sharing. We now take the profit-sharing hypothesis as a
working hypothesis for Korea. First, a specification by Freeman and
Weitzman is used, so that coefficients of our Korean equation are directly
comparable to those of the Japanese equation by Freeman and Weitzman.
Ln(B(t)/W(t)) — a0 + a1t + b*x(t) + c*LnB(t-l) + d*LnW(tl) + e(t)
where x(t) is an economic condition, that is, one of the following:
Corporate operating profits (PROF), Corporate value added (VA), Gross
domestic products (GDP), or Corporate net sales (NS). A constant and a time
trend is also included in the regression. A positively significant b
implies that the bonus/wage ratio increases when the economic condition
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improves. Put differently, bonus is a contingent pay so that it is more
responsive to economic conditions than the wage. All variables are deflated
by relevant components of Wholesale Price Index.
Table 3-1 shows how the bonus-wage ratio responds to various economic
conditions. (Coefficients of a constant, a time trend and lagged bonus and
wage variables are not reported in this table.) Although magnitudes of the
bonus/wage elasticities with respect to various economic conditions in Korea
are quite comparable to the Japanese counterparts, but they are not always
statistically significant at the 5% level. For all industries, no economic
condition has a significant coefficient. For the manufacturing sector, the
result is more favorable to the hypothesis that bonus is not just a
disguised wage. Both corporate value added and corporate net sales show
positive estimates which are statistically significant. In particular,
profits do not appear to have a statistically significant impact on the
bonus/wage ratio. These evidences appear to cast some doubts on the profit-
sharing hypothesis.
Among the 2-digit manufacturing industries (shown in panel C) textiles,
apparells and leather show positive, significant coefficients for any
economic conditions. VA and NS are often found significant in the
investigation of the 2-digit manufacturing sectors.
Insert Table 3-1 about here
In sum, the evidence for the profit-sharing hypothesis from
investigating the bonus/wage ratio appears to be weaker in Korea than in
Japan. In particular, corporate operating profits do not influence the
bonus/wage ratio in any aggregation level. However, corporate value added,
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and net sales in manufacturing secor, has a significant influence on the
bonus/wage ratio.
The next test, that is also adopted from Freeman and Weitzman is to
estimate the bonus and wage equations separately. In each equation, an
economic condition variable and the lagged dependent variable are included.
In Table 3-2, estimated coefficients of economic conditions are shown.
(Again, coefficients of a constant term, a time trend and the lagged
dependent variable are not reported in the table.)
Insert Table 3-2 about here
Two observations from Table 3-2 are obvious. First, when responses of
bonuses and ages are compared within Korea, bonuses respond to economic
conditions more than wages, as Freeman and Weitzman found in Japan. Second,
when an international comparison can be conducted, both bonuses and wages in
Korea are found more sensitive to economic conditions than their
counterparts in Japan.
The first observation is not inconsistent with findings in Table 3-1,
in which the bonus/wage ratio was found not particularly sensitive to
economic conditions in Korea. Imat is implied by both findings is that the
difference in elasticities of bonuses and wages with respect to economic
conditions is not statistically significant. This is most evident in the
case of profits. The bonus elasticity to profits is very large in Korea:
0.54 for all industries (0.09 in Japan) and 0.73 for manufacturing sectors
(0.14 in Japan). This is a strong evidence for a profit sharing hypothesis
in Korea. However, the wage also responds to profits in Korea: 027 for
all industries (-0.05 in Japan) and 0.56 for manufacturing industries (-0.05
in Japan). These evidences for a profit sharing hypothesis are not incon-
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sistent with weak evidences in Table 3-1, which use the bonus/wage ratio as
the left-hand side variable, because both a numerator and a denominator the
bonus/wage ratio changed strongly with economic conditions, leaving the
ratio rather unstable.
Table 3-2 (panel C) shows a summary result concerning all 2-digit
manufacturing industries and with respect to all candidates of economic
conditions, the bonus elasticities are greater than the wage elasticities.
However, elasticities with respect to value added and net sales are greater
than those with respect to profits.
In sum, both bonuses and wages respond positively to favorable economic
conditions in Korea, and those elasticities in Korea are larger than their
counterparts in Japan. Is there any good explanation for these findings
from institutional arrangements in Korea? As explained, there are some
evidences that the lifetime employment system is not (yet) instituted in the
Korean labor market. Hence, the market is more or less a "spot" market
rather than a long-term contract market in Korea.? Higher profits or sales
increase labor demand, which in turn increases bonuses and wages. Then, it
is natural that wages, as well as bonuses, respond to economic conditions
through changes in labor demand.
The third test of bonus behavior is to examine bonuses as a function of
wages and economic conditions. Since bonuses are determined months after
wage negotiations, wages may be regarded as "predetermined" when a bonus
month comes. If bonuses are simply a disguised wage, coefficients of
economic conditions are not significant in a regression of bonuses with
wages on the right-hand side. On the other hand, if bonuses are determined
solely by profit sharing, then the wage coefficient would be insignificant.
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Hence, the following equations are estimated:
Ln(B(t)) — a0 + a1t + b*x(t) + c*LnB(t-1) + d*LriW(t) + e(t)
where b — 0, if bonuses are disguised (fixed markup of) wages; and d — 0 if
bonuses are solely "sharing." Table 3-3 shows the regression results.
Insert Table 3-3 about here
The estimation for the manufacturing sector with value added produced
reasonable estimates for the profit-sharing hypothesis: b 0 and insigni-
ficant d. That equation also implies that the base line for (log) bonus in
year t is determined by 47 percent of bonus in year t-l and 66 percent of
wage in year t. If value added increased by 10 percent, then bonuses
increase by 2 percent above the base line.
Using profits, neither b nor d is significant, not implying one
hypothesis or the other. Estimates involving other economic variables show
that the negative coefficients on wage, though insignificant, contradicting
with expected signs.
Results among 2-digit manufacturing sectors are mixed. For example,
estimates for the paper and printing sector support the wage-markup
(disguised wage) hypothesis; while a result for the fabricated metal and
products sector suggests the profit sharing hypothesis.
(iii) Bonuses and Employment
Although results in the preceding subsection are suggestive of a
scenario in which bonuses responding to economic conditions, and much more
so than Japan, some suspicions still remain as to whether bonuses determined
in a market (like wages), or a part of profit-sharing. One way to further
differentiate these two hypotheses is to estimate an employment equation (a
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reduced form of the labor demand and supply functions), and see whether
bonuses and wages have different coefficients on employment.
In order to differentiate the effect of bonuses and wages on employment
behavior, EMP, the following two specifications have been adopted:
Ln(EMP(t)) = a + bbl*Ln(W+B) + b2LnB(t) + bb4x(t) + bbSEMP(t-l) + ebx(t)
Ln(EMP(t)) — a + b 1*Ln(W+B) + b3LnW(t) + bw4X(t) + bwsEMP(tl) + ewx(t)
If bonuses are just disguised wage, then coefficients of b2 and b3 should be
insignificant. We hasten to add that these equations, at the present
specifications, suffer from the possible simultaneity bias, which should be
corrected.
Results are shown in Table 3-4 (which should be compared with Freeman-
Weitzman Table V) . As in the case of Japan, coefficients of bonuses have
positive signs and those of wages have negative signs, a surprisingly
consistent result. However, standard errors seem to be larger in the Korean
case. In sum, a hypothesis of bonus being a profit-sharing instrument
receives a mild support, if not a strong one, from a correct sign pattern in
the employment equation, with somewhat weaker significance levels, in Korea.
Insert Table 3-4 about here
In order to check the simultaneity noted above, a simple vector
autoregression model with employment, wages, and bonuses is examined. An
economic condition, i.e. , PROF, VA, GDP, or NS, is used as an exogenous
variable. Only one lag is allowed due to the degree of freedom problem.
(Results are not reported in this version of the paper.) There is no reason
to reject interdependence between the three variables. However, there is a
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weakly, at about the ten to twenty percent significance level in all
industries, from bonuses to employment. (A similar conclusion was obtained
by Freeman and Weitzman for Japan.) Hence, there is no statistical support
for running regressions among the three variables, and results in Table 3-4
should be taken with this caveat.
4. Overtime Payments in Korea
In the preceding section, we have established that bonuses are
contingent on economic fluctuations in Korea. Elasticities of bonuses with
respect to economic conditions in Korea are even greater than in Japan.
However, it is also found that monthly wages strongly respond to economic
fluctuations in Korea in contrast to Japan. One might suspect that much of
the monthly wage fluctuations comes from overtime payments, which, as
explained in subsection 3(1), is part of 'monthly wage." In this section,
the behavior of overtime payments are separated from the monthly wage and
examined carefully.
When there is a demand shock, the first thing that the firm would do is
to ask employees to work overtime. Since a boom may be temporary,
employment may not be adjusted when the hiring and firing costs are large.
In addition, bonuses could be paid if profits exceeded its anticipation.
Only when an increase in the product demand sustains, the employment level
will be adjusted.
An adjustment in overtime pay almost automatically follows an adjust-
ment in hours, while bonuses carry a discretionary portion of the
compensation adjustment. There is no a priori reason to believe that whether
bonuses become more sensitive to economic conditions than overtime payments.
However, if bonuses as a profit sharing mechanism are to be emphasized, it
should be established that bonuses are more flexible than overtime payments.
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Otherwise, the pay flexibilities may be regarded as a reflection of hours
adjustment.
First, the behavior of the (overtime)/(base wage) ratio, depending on
various economic conditions, is examined. Table 4-1 for the overtime ratio
parallels Table 3-1 for bonuses. In order to compare the overtime and bonus
sensitivities, the (bonus)/(base wage) and the (overtime)/(base wage) terms,
using the same denominator, are regressed on the same independent variables.
Insert Table 4-1 about here
The table shows that the sensitivities of overtime pay with respect to
economic conditions are, most of the time, smaller than that of bonuses.
Although coefficients on economic conditions are insignificant for the all-
industries level, they are significant at the manufacturing level. Among
the 2-digit manufacturing industries, results using overtime are in general
not much different from those using bonuses. This shows that overtime pays
in manufacturing sectors behave procyclically with economic conditions.
Next we examine how the change in an economic condition affects various
components of compensations. Table 4-2, which is in parallel with Table 3-
2, compares changes in each of bonuses, overtime payments, and the base wage
responding to profits, value added, CDP or net sales.
Insert Table 4-2 about here
In Korea, for both the all-industries and aggregate-manufacturing
levels, all types of compensations have large and statistically significant
coefficients on most of the economic conditions. The sensitivity of bonus
is much greater than that of overtime, and the overtime sensitivity in turn
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is greater than the base wage sensitivity. Even for 2-digit msnufscturing
sectors, the order of msgnitudes in sensitivities is mostly confirmed. Thst
is, denoting by e(x) the elasticity of x with respect to an economic
condition, the following is true in Korea:
e(bonus) > e(overtime) > e(wsge bsse).
However, this nice relationship is not confirmed in Jspsn. Sometimes the
bonus sensitivity is much smaller than the overtime sensitivities, although
it is typicslly larger than the bsse wsge sensitivity.
From these findings, we may conclude thst bonuses are more responsive
to economic fluctuations than overtime pay, at least in Korea. Hence, a
suspicion thst overtime pay is more flexible thsn bonuses is now refuted by
the dats in Japan. The conclusion would be much wesker in Jspan.
Table 4-3 examines an alternative apecificstion for overtime psy, in
parallel with Table 3-3 for bonuses. In this specificstion, economic condi-
tions hsve significant coefficients less often than Table 4-2 at the all-
industries and the sggregate manufacturing sector. In general, this speci-
fication does not give us much insights on the determinant of overtime psys,
except that in manufacturing sector, overtime psy does respond to sn
economic conditions.
Insert Table 4-3 sbout here
Table 4-4, in psrallel with Tsble 3-4, examines whether the overtime
psy and the wsge base have different impacts on employment. No significant
coefficient was obtained for overtime pay or the wage base at the all-
industries level. This is the same pattern of signs that was found in Table
3-4 contrasting bonuses and monthly wages. Hence, we may apply an
interpretation similar to one given to Table 3-4. Overtime payments have a
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role quite different from wage base. Overtime payments are clearly
procyclical (to employment), while the wage base is negatively correlated
with employment. This is quite consistent with any prediction from 'abor
demand theory with temporal fluctuations. Typically, overtime payments
behave much like bonuses in increasing employment.
Insert Table 4-4 about here
In sum, an investigation into overtime payments reveals that bonuses
and overtime payments play similar roles. Both respond to economic
conditions, with the elasticity of bonuses being greater than that of
overtime payments. Both have an effect to increase an employment level,
with the marginal contribution of overtime pay being greater than bonuses.
However, a further work is needed on roles of bonuses and overtime payments
in adjustments in hours, compensations, and employment.
5. Further Investigations
(i) Labor Market Conditions
One of the often-heard criticism of the profit-sharing hypothesis, in
particular when the hypothesis is empirically applied, is that the
hypothesis ignores labor market conditions, which are usually considered
to be central in the wage determination. In the case of wage negotiation,
an influence of the unemployment rate, for example, is important, because it
signals the excess supply condition and changes relative strength in
negotiation. However, an answer to the following criticism is not obvious:
Would the amount of bonuses differ if the unemployment rate is different
given the level of net profits? In this sub-section, effects of the
unemployment rate on the bonuses and overtime will be examined. To this
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end, the following specification is used:
ln(y(t)) — a0 + a1t + bln(x(t)) + cln(y(t-l)) + d(UE(t))
where y — (B, OT, WE) and x is one of the economic condition variables used
in the preceding section, namely (PROF VA, GDP, NS). Results are
summarized in Table 5-1.
Insert Table 5-1 about here
There are two observations on this table. First, even if the unemploy-
ment rate is added to the equation, one of the salient features of the
elasticities with respect to economic conditions still holds, namely,
e(B)>e(OT)>e(WB). Therefore, it seems that adding the unemployment rate
does not change results obtained in the preceding section.
Second, although the unemployment rate negatively influences bonuses,
overtime pay, and wage bases, as theory would expect, it is most significant
for the wage base equation. Certainly, the unemployment rate is important
in wage (rate) negotiations, but may not be so in the bonus determination.
This finding is a further evidence against a bonus-as-disguised-wage
hypothesis, in that bonuses and base wages are two different things in how
each responds to an economic condition and a labot market condition.
(ii) Pooled Regression
Since we have used annual data, as Freeman and Weitzman did, the number
of observations is not so large in Korea. One trick to overcome the problem
of small samples is to use both time-series and cross-section data. Table
5-2 (A) shows a result of a pooled regression with sectoral and year dummy
variables. Its panel (A-l) shows a familiar result, that the elasticity of
bonus with respect to an economic condition is greater than that of the
monthly wages. Therefore, we may conclude that this result is a robust one.
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Insert Table 5-2 about here
A null hypothesis that sectoral dummy variables are collectively zero
is tested in Table 5-2, panel (A-2). The hypothesis is not rejected in the
wage equation and rejected in the bonus equation, for each of the three
types of economic conditions: Bonuses are very sector-specific, while the
wage is non-sector specific. In other words, the wage is determined in an
entire economy, due to high cross-sector mobilities.
A different specification is attempted in Table 5-2 (B), where a trend
term is used instead of year dummy variables, while sector-specific
elasticities are introduced. In this specification, the null hypothesis of
common intercepts and common elasticities is tested. The hypothesis is
rejected, implying that the ways bonuses and wages respond to an economic
condition are quite different from one sector to another.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper examined the bonus system of Korea in contrast to that of
Japan. The bonus-wage ratio in Korea has been increasing rapidly and,
currently, the ratio is about the same as that of Japan in late 1950s.
In Korea, not only bonuses but also monthly wages move procyclically
with economic conditions, so that the bonus-wage ratio does not necessarily
appear to be sensitive to economic conditions. This contrasts to the
movements of the Japanese bonus/wage ratio and the monthly wage.
One might suspect that the flexible wage in Korea is due to overtime
payments that are included in "monthly wages." When the overtime pay and
the wage base are separated, it is revealed that not only overtime but also
wage base fluctuate with economic conditions. In Korea, the elasticities
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with respect to economic conditions are ordered as the bonus elasticity
being the greatest, the overtime next, and the wage base the smallest. This
tendency is not so clear-cut in Japan.
Both bonuses and overtime payments have a positive effect on the
employment level in Korea. However, a futher investigation is needed to
uncover a mechanism of hours, employment, and payment adjustments in
response to economic fluctuations in Korea and in Japan.
When the unemployment rate is added to a list of independent variable,
the wage base is found to be most sensitive to this labor market indicator.
Bonuses and overtime pay tend to be influenced more by economic conditions,
such as net sales and profits, more than the unemployment rate.
Lastly, pooled regressions were conducted to check whether we might
have been misled using small-sample regressions. The bonus elasticity was
found to be greater than the wage elasticity, a familiar result, even in the
pooled regressions. Sectoral dummy variables are found to be not common for
all sectors.
Although we investigated the Korean bonus system in various manners,
more questions came up as soon as we solved one question. The following
topics are left for future research. Is there any tendency that mobility of
workers has declined due to a development of the bonus system in Korea? How
does the firm adjust overtime, bonuses, and employment? Does the bonus/wage
ratio in Korea change systematically and significantly with respect to the
length of service and with the size of establishments, as in Japan? If so,
does the sectoral disparity in the size of the bonus/wage ratio and in the
bonus elasticities reflect any institutional, demographic differences amond
the sectors? In any case, we hope that this paper stimulates more research
on the Korean labor market with comparative perspectives.
Bonus—3.TXT
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Footnotes
1. Widespread bonuses, including those to blue-collar workers, have been
identified as one of the distinctive features of the Japanese labor market.
Other prominent features include lifetime employment and seniority wages and
promotions. These Japanese features have been examined for example by
Hashimoto (1979) and Hashimoto and Raisian (1985). In these papers, workers
in Japan are found to stay in the same firm longer than those in the U.S.
and wages in Japan depend on age as well as the length of service in the
same firm. Moreover, the earning-age profile in Japan is shown to be
steeper than that in the United States.
2. Susan Collins (1988) compared the investment-saving balances of Japan
and Korea, since both countries achieved a rapid economic growth supported
by high investment. She found that Japan slowed investment when the balance
of payments worsened, avoiding borrowing from abroad, while Korea borrowed
from abroad when the domestic saving dropped below an investment target.
3. However, a question arises with this interpretation. If subsistency is
the reason, why is there a significant differential between large and small
firms? Why does the aggregate wage payment increase over time? I think
that the finding does not contradict with other possible explanations, for
example a long-term contracting model.
4. The share of bonuses in an annual compensation can be easily calculated
by (share in annual compensation) = (bonus ratio)/(12+bonus ratio)
5. 73.6 % on overall average; 68% for small (200-499 employee) firms, 75%
for medium-size (500-999) firms, and 83.3% for large (1000+) firms.
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6. To be exact, special payments include not only bonuses but also other
special payments. However, the portion of "other payments" is very small,
so that we regard special payments as bonuses.
7. It has been established that wages in Japan are much more flexible than
wages in the United States; and employment in Japan is much more stable than
that in the United States. These findings are explained in that Japan needs
wage flexibility in order to keep lifetime employment. If this logic can be
extended to Korea, then the Korean wage flexibility that is higher than the
Japanese flexibility should imply the super stability of employment in
Korea. As will be shown in below, employment in Korea is not more stable
than in Japan. However, workers in Japan and the United States tend to stay
a long time in the same firm, while workers in Korea seem to change jobs
much more often. In the spot market both wages and employment respond to
economic conditions.
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Data Appendix
Definitions
Compensation for workers are classified as follows.
Yearly compensation = Bonus + 12*(Monthly Wage)
onth1y Wage = Wage Base + Overtime Pay
"Monthly Wage" corresponds to "Kimatte Shikyu Sareru Kyuyo" in
Japan. This is the variable used as "wage" by Freeman and
Weitzman.
Sources of the Korean Data
Variable Definition and Source
Bonus Special cash payments not included in any regular
wage contract. Annual won paid, regularly and/or
irregularly, to the regular workers in firms with
10 or more regular workers. Annual payments over
calendar year, except from 1973—75 when it
measures the sum given out from May 1 (of previous
year) to April 30, and 1976—77 when it measures
the sum given out from April 1 (of previous year)
to March 31. Source, Korean Ministry of Labor,
"Report on Occupational Wage Survey."
Wage Base Cash earnings including base payment and other
allowances, but excluding special payments or
overtime payments. These payments are paid to the
regular workers in firms with 10 or more regular
workers per month as predetermined by labor
contract, labor union contract or the firms' pay
rule. It measures the payment in March of the
year, except front 1971 to 1975 during which it
represents monthly wage given out during April of
the year. Source: Korean Ministry of Labor
"Report on Occupational Wage Survey."
Overtime Wage Same as Wage Base.
Employment Total number of regular workers employed
indefinitely or under contract for a period longer
than one month, in establishments with at least 10
regular workers. Data for March 1 of the year,
except from 1971 to 1975 during which the data
represent the number of regular workers on April
1 of the year. Source: Korean Ministry of Labor,
"Report on Occupational Wage Survey."
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Profit Total corporate operating profits for firms with 5
or more regular workers for each calendar year.
Source: The Bank of Korea "Analysis of Financial
Statements."
Net Sales Total corporate net sales for firms with 5 or more
regular workers for each calendar year.
Value Added Total corporate value added for firms with 5 or
more regular workers for each calendar year.
Source: The Bank of Korea, "Analysis of Financial
Statements.
Gross Domestic Products. Gross output by industrial origin at
market prices over the calendar year. Source: The
Bank of Korea, "Analysis of Financial Statements."
Wholesale Price Index. Calendar year average of the wholesale
price index by groups of conunodities. 1985=100.
Indices for "Mining," "Manufacturing 1 and 2
digits" and "Industrial power, Water" indices were
used to derive the real variables in those
inductries. However, the indices for other
industries are not available. Therefore, the
average wholesale price index was used for those
industries. Agriculture is excluded in the whole
analysis. Source: The Bank of Korea, "Analysis of
Financial Statements."
Sources of the Japanese Data
Bonuses Freeman and Weitzman (1987)
monthly wages Freeman and Weitzman (1987)
Overtime pay series was constructed from Labor Statistics
Monthly, Department of Labor, Japanese Government.
Bonus-ap.txt, Appendix - 2 -
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Table 2—1: Bonus/Wage Ratio in Korean Manufacturing Sectors
Year 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
1971 0.77 0.42 0.35 0.72 1.28 0.66 0.62 0.36 0.44
1972 0.40 0.35 0.25 1.02 0.89 0.62 0.60 0.44 0.76
1973 0.59 0.63 0.34 0.72 0.94 0.69 0.97 0.34 0.10
1974 1.02 0.55 0.52 0.70 1.07 2.02 1.23 0.52 0.39
1975 1.14 0.78 0.64 1.29 1.56 1.31 1.40 1.00 0.45
1976 1.72 1.18 0.81 1.31 1.67 1.46 1.38 1.32 0.39
1977 1.35 0.97 0.91 1.56 1.67 1.45 1.37 1.43 0.69
1978 1.64 0.99 1.15 1.64 1.63 1.57 1.50 1.50 0.83
1979 2.20 1.33 1.44 2.13 2.13 1.48 1.96 1.71 1.16
1980 2.00 1.18 1.05 1.88 2.21 1.74 1.76 1.71 0.92
1981 2.13 1.26 0.98 1.54 2.09 1.79 1.82 1.67 1.10
1982 2.30 1.34 1.14 1.83 2.24 1.75 1.99 1.92 1.24
1983 2.38 1.20 0.77 1.98 1.97 2.02 1.71 1.72 0.94
1984 2.30 1.12 0.81 1.97 2.26 2.00 2.05 1.86 1.06
1985 2.23 1.15 0.77 2.05 2.14 2.20 2.32 1.91 1.10
1986 2.21 1.22 1.13 2.00 2.14 2.26 2.47 1.98 1.14
Manufacturing sector codes:
31 FB Food and Beverages
32 TL Textiles, Apparels, and Leather
33 WF Wood and Furniture
34 pp Paper, Printing and Publishing
35 CP Chemicals, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and Plastics
36 NM Non-Metallic Mineral Products
37 BM Basic Metal
38 FM Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery, and Equipnient
39 OM Other nianufacturing
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Table 3—1, Korea-Japan Comparison of Elasticities
Ln(B(t)/W(t)) =a0* a1t •bx(t) •c*LnB(t1)*d*LnW(t.1)*e(t)
where x(t) is an economic condition.
Estimates and Standard Errors of b
A. All industries
Economic condition Korea Japan
Corporate 0.05 0.15
operating profit (PROF) (0.20) (0.02)**
Corporate 0.21 0.29
value added (VA) (0.11) (0.06)**
Gross (or Net) 0.12 0.20
domestic product (GDP) (0.28) (0.11)
Corporate 0.14 na
net sales (NS) (0.24)
B. Manufacturing sectors
PROF 0.21 0.18
(0.35) (0.03)**
0.18 0.37
(0.05)** (0.07)**
GDP 0.50 0.19
(or NDP for Japan) (0.34) (0.12)
NS 0.71 na
(0.32) *
Notes: ** significance at the 1% level.
* significance at the 5% level.
C. Number of Cases among 2-digit Industry, Korea
Significance of b
economic condition 1% 1 - 5% not at 5%
PROF 0 1(TL) 8
1(TL) 1(BM) 7
NS 2(TL,FB) 0 0
Korea: See Appendix. Samples, 1971-1986. Japan: Freeman—
Weitzman (Table 1, p.174) estimated in the same specification,
except (i) NDP instead of GDP is used; (ii) samples are 1960—83.
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Tab].e 3-2: Responses of Bonuses and Wages to Economic Conditions
Ln(y(t)) = • a1 • bx(t) • cLnB(t-1) • e(t)
where x(t) is an economic condition, y(t) is either B(t) or W(t)
B(t) is Bonus payments; and W(t) is Monthly Wage.
Estiiiiates and (Standard Errors) of b.
A. A].]. industries, Korea Japan
LHS econ. condition Bonus Wage Bonus Wage
B Corporate profit 0.54 0.09
(PR) (0.28)* (0.05)
W Corporate profit 0.27 —0.05
(PR) (0.10)* (0.07)
B Value added 0.51 0.28
(VA) (0.11)** (0.10)*
W Value added 0.15 0.12
(VA) (0.07) (0.12)
B GDP (NDP for J) 0.67 0.44
(0.42) (0.14)**
W GDP (NDP for J) 0.55 0.34
(0.13)** (0.13)**
B Net Sales 0.81 na
(NS) (0.30)*
W Net Sales 0.21 na
(NS) (0.11)**
B. Manufacturing sectors
B Corporate profit 0.73 0.14
(PR) (0.38) (0.04)**
W Corporate profit 0.56 —0.05
(PR) (0.13)** (0.05)
B Value added 0.22 0.37
(VA) (0.05)** (0.08)**
W Value added 0.04 0.05
(VA) (0.04) (0.11)
B GDP (NDP for J) 1.17 0.38
(0.30)** (0.11)**
W GDP (NDP for J) 0.54 0.05
(0.13)** (0.11)
B Net Sales 1.33 na
(NS) (0.24)**
W Net Sales 0.37 na
(NS) (0.14)*
Number of Cases among 2—digit manufacturing sectors
y x 1% 1-5% not at 5% (significance)
B PROF 1 (CP) 1 (TL) 7
W PROF 1 (FM) 1 (CP) 7
B VA 4 3 2
W VA 6 0 3
B NS 5 2 2
W NS 5 0 4
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Table 2-3, Bonus as a Disguised Wage?
Ln(B(t)) = a0 + a1t + b*X(t) + c*LnB(t_1) + d*LnW(t) + e(t)
where x is Economic Condition.
Estimates and (Standard Errors) of b, c, d
A. all industries
economic Korea Japan
condition b c d b c d
Corporate 0.59 0.31 -0.13 0.11 0.43 0.75
profit (0.39) (0.30) (0.70) (O.03)** (Q.09)** (0.11)**
Corporate 0.51 0.27 0.02 0.26 0.33 0.66
value added (0.12)** (0.17) (0.37) (0.06)** (0.09)** (0.10)**
GDP 0.82 0.47 -0.23 n.a.
(0.72) (0.27) (0.89)
Corporate 0.93 -0.04 -0.29 n.a.
net sales (0.40)* (0.35) (0.59) 1
B. Manufacturing sectors
economic Korea Japan
condition b c d b c d
Corporate 0.61 0.44 0.19 0.14 0.52 0.61
profit (0.65) (0.25) (0.84) (0.03)** (0.09)** (0.13)**
Corporate 0.21 0.47 0.66 0.32 0.40 0.58
value added (0.05)** (0.15)* (0.32) (0.06)** (0.09)** (0.12)**
GDP 1.58 0.23 -0.65 n.a.
(0.46)** (0.19) (0.56)
Corporate 1.41 -0.02 -0.17 n.a.
net sales (o.3o)** (0.17) (0.37)
C. Number of cases among 2-digit uianufacturing sectors, Korea
1% 1-5% not at 5% 1% 1-5% not at 5%
PROF 1(PP) 1(FM) 7 1(PP) 2 6
VA 1(FM) 4 4 1(PP) 0 8
NS 2 2 5 0 3 6
Notes: see Table 2-1.
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Table 3-4: Labor Demand Equation
Ln(1P(t)) = a0+a1t + b1*Ln(W+B) + b2LnB(t) + b4x(t) + b5ln(ENP(t-1)) + eex(t)
Ln(EMP(t)) = a0+a1t + b1*Ln(W+B) + b3LnW(t) + b4x(t) + b5ln(EMP(t-1)) + eex(t)
Estimates and significance values of b
I
JAPAN
W+B b4 W+B b4
A. All Industries
0.43 0.33 -0.33 0.28
(0.24) (0.14)* (0.10)** (QQ7)**
0.20 0.29 PROF 0.25(0.29) (0.14) (0.18)
0.39 0.23 VA 0.12(0.25) (0.19) (0.15)
-0.31 0.27 GDP 0.82 -0.37 0.21 NDP 0.15(0.28) (0.10)* (o.17)* (0.06)** (0.05)** (QQ3)*
0.23 0.22 NS 0.36(0.25) (0.14) (0.20)
4.52 -3.85 0.83 -0.83(1.89)* (1.84) (0.23)** (0.25)**
3.56 -3.17 PROF 0.25
(1.99) (1.87) (0.20)
3.02 -2.51 VA 0.16
(2.17) (2.07) (0.13)
3.46 -3.64 GDP 0.89 0.49 -0.65 NDP 0.16(Q.95)** (0.91) (0.16)** (0.15)** (0.14)** (Q03)**
2.52 -2.16 NS 0.38
(2.08) (1.95) (0.22)
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B. Manufacturing
0.33 0.39 -0.20 0.18
(0.21) (0.15) (0.20) (0.16)
0.10 0.41 PROF 0.24
(0.33) (o.1S)* (0.26)
0.34 0.38 VA 0.005
(0.22) (0.18) (0.004)
-0.07 0.29 GDP 0.51 -0.39 0.14 j9 0.32
(0.29) (0.15) (0.32) (0.16)* (0.13) (Q.09)**
0.10 0.16 NS 0.72
(0.19) (0.15) (0.30)
5.06 -4.46 0,39 -0.41
(2.24) (2.21) (0.50) (0.51)
5.25 -4.84 PROF 0.22(2.31) (2.32) (0.29)
4.76 -4.14 VA 0.03
(2.35) (2.33) (0.04)
3.70 -3.61 GDP 0.64 0.14 -0,40 N 0.33
(2.01) (1.93) (0.29) (0.38) (0,39) (0.09)
1.62 -1,45 NS 0.79
(2.12) (2.01) (o.28)*
Source: Korea, see Data appendix
Japan, Freeman-Weitzman (1987; p.183)
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Table 4—1
Ln(B(t)/WB(t)) = a0+a1t+b*x(t)+c*LnB(t_1)+d*LnWB(t_1)+e2(t)
Ln(OT(t)/WB(t)) = a0+a1t+b*x(t)+c*LnOT(t_1)+d*LnWB(t_1)+e1(t)
Estimates and significance value of Korea and Japan
A. all industries
econ Korea Japan
cond ln(B(t)/WB(t) ln(OT(t)/WB(t)) ln(B(t)/WB(t) ln(OT(t)/WB(t))
PROF 0.11 0.09 0.15 0.29
(0.23) (0.11) (0.04)* (0.1l)**
VA 0.27 0.11 0.17 0.11
(0.12) (0.06) (0.08)* (0.17)
GDP 0.19 0.18 0.03 —0.04
(NDP) (0.33) (0.19) (0.09) (0.16)
NS 0.23 0.12 na na
(0.28) (0.10)
B. Manufacturing sectors
PROF 0.27 0.37 0.19 0.45
(0.36) (0.18) (0.03)** (0.14)*
VA 0.19 0.10 0.25 0.30
(0.05)** (0.04)* (0.06)** (0.28)
GDP 0.56 0.62 0.04 —0.17
(NDP) (0.35) (0.16)** (0.09) (0.23)
NS 0.78 0.64 na na
(0.33)* (0.17)**
C. Nuither of Cases among 2—digit industris, Korea
Bonus Overtime
1% 1—5% not at 5% 1% 1—5% not at 5%
PROF 0 1(TL) 8 0 1(FM) 8
VA 1(TL) 1(FB) 7 1(FB) 3 5
NS 2(FB,TL) 0 7 1(FB) 2 6
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Table 4—2: Sensitivities of Bonus, Overtime, and Wage Base
Ln(y(t)) = a0+a1t+b*x(t)+c*Ln(y(t-1)) + e(t)
where y = (B, OT, WB); x = one of (PROF, VA, GDP, NS).
Estimates and Standard Errors of b
A. all industries
econ. Korea
cond. Bonus Overtime Wage Base
PROF 0.54 0.34 0.25
(0.28) (0.14)* (0.09)*
VA 0.51 0.22
(0.11)** (0.09)*
0.13
(0.07)
GDP 0.67 0.71 0.51
(0.42) (0.19)** (0.13)**
Japan
Bonus Overtime Wage Base
0.14 0.38 0.01
(Q.05)* (0.11)** (0.07)
0.36 0.41 0.24
(0.07)** (0.12)** (Q.09)*
0.37 0.39 0.40
(0.08)** (0.12)** (0.08)**
N5 0.81 0.31 0.19 na na na
(0.31)* (0.14) (0.10)
B. Manufacturing sectors
PROF 0.73 0.90 0.48
(0.38) (0.21)** (0.12)**
VA 0.22 0.11 0.02
(0.05)** (0.06) (0.04)
GDP 1.17 1.14 0.45
(0.30)** (0.12)** (0.13)**
NS 1.33 0.89 0.30
(0.24)* (0.19)** (0.14
0.18 0.34 —0.00
(0.03)** (0.10)** (0.05)
0.37 0.28 0.16
(0.04)** (0.13)* (0.09)
0.29 0.17 0.27
(0.07)** (0.13) (0.06)
na na na
C. Number of significant
Korea
cond. Bonus
1% 1—5% no 1%
cases 5%
Overtime
1—5% no
among
1%
2-digit manuf. sectors
Korea
Wage Base e(B)>e(OT)>e(WB)
1—5% no yes no
PROF 0 2 7 1 2 6 1 2 6 3 6
VA 5 0 4 6 0 3 6 0 3 6 3
NS 2 3 4 4 1 4 4 1 4 8 1
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Table 4—3: Alternative specification: Determinants of Overtime Pay
Ln(OT(t)) = a + b*x(t) + c*LnOT(t-1) + d*LnWB(t) + e(t)
where x is Economic Condition.
Estimates and (Standard Errors) of b, d
A. All industries,
economic Korea Japan
condition b d b d
Corporate 0.12 0.87 0.31 —0.01
profits (0.13) (0.29)* (0.11)* (0.22)
Corporate 0.13 0.87 0.40 -0.21
valueadded (0.07) (0.22)** (0.21) (0.21)
GDP 0.33 0.69 —0.42 0.36
(0.25) (0.33) (0.26) (0.17)*
Corporate 0.15 0.89 na na
net sales (0.11) (0.25)**
B. Manufacturing sectors
condition b d b d
Corporate 0.72 0.38 0.42 0.04
profits (0.29)* (0.43) (0.12)** (0.21)
Corporate 0.12 1.15 0.76 0.11
value added (0.03)** (0.26)** (0.26)** (0.22)
GDP 1.00 0.35 0.36 0.37
(0.12)** (0.17) (0.30) (0.23)
Corporate 0.74 0.78 na na
net sales (0.13)** (0.20)**
C. Number of
significance:
cases
1%
among
b
1—5%
2—digit
no
sectors,
1%
Korea
d
1—5% no
PROF 0 0 9 4 2 3
VA 3 1 5 3 0 6
NS 1 2 6 3 0 6
Bonus—t4.txt (6/89) Tables — 9 —
Table 4-4: Labor Demand Equation, overti wage
Ln(EMP(tfl=a0+a1t+b1*Ln(W(t)+OT(tfl+b2LnOT(t)+b4X(t)+b5EMP(t_1)+e(t)
Estimates and significance values of b
KOREA JAPAN
b1 b2 b3 x b4 b1 b2 b3 x b4
A. All Industries
-0.06 0.55 -0.12 0.10
(0.53) (0.45) (0.08) (0.06)
-0.45 0.58 PROF 0.39 -0.05 0.04 PROF 0.05
(0.50) (0.39) (0.19) (0.09) (0.10) (0.05)
-0.21 0.16 VA 0.23 -0.15 -0.001 VA 0.21
(0.50) (0.46) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
-0.78 0.41 GDP 0.96 -0.25 -0.03 NDP 0.39
(0.35) (0.27) (O.22)** (O.09)* (0.07) (0.13)*
-0.30 0.49 NS 0.52 na
(0.41) (0.34) (O.18)*
2.68 -2.20 0.91 -0.93
(1.97) (1.95) (0.61) (0.60)
2.57 -2.45 PROF 0.40 0.41 -0.41 PROF 0.05
(1.71) (1.70) (0.19)* (0.99) (0.96) (0.05)
0.87 -0.50 VA 0.24 -0.21 0.06 VA 0.21
(2.05) (2.00) (0.13) (0.84) (0.77) (0.i0)
1.29 -1.67 GDP 0.97 -0.45 0.19 NDP 0.37
(1.22) (1.17) (0.22) (0.68) (0.61) (0.12)**
2.31 -2.12 NS 0.53 na
(1.50) (1.48) (0.18)
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Table 4-4: Labor Demand Equation, overtime wage
KOREA JAPAN
b1 b2 b3 x b4 b1 b2 b3 x b4
B. Manufacturing
-0.46 0.83 —0.09 0.10
(0.30) (0.23)** (0.04)* (0.02)**
-0.39 0.84 PROF -0.02 -0.05 0.01 PROF 0.06
(0.35) (0.25)** (0.24) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02)*
-0.66 1.03 VA -0.04 -0.15 -0.01 VA 0.19
(0.22) (0.22)** (0.04) (Q.05)**(0.04) (0.05)**
-0.40 0.82 GDP 0.02 -0.10 0.08 NDP 0.06
(0.31) (0.43) (0.50) (0.06) (0.04) (0.10)
-0.24 0.43 NS 0.59 na
(0.28) (0.30) (0.31)
3.91 —3.51 1.02 -1.01(0.89)** (0.91)** (0.22)** (0.20)**
3.92 -3.51 PROF -0.01 0.30 -0.32 PROF 0.05(1.00)** (0.97)** (0.23) (0.40) (0.37) (0.03)
4.46 -4.10 VA -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 VA 0.17
(1.07) (1.11)** (0.04) (0.42) (0.36) (0.06)*
3.94 -3.53 GDP -0.01 0.94 -0.93 NDP 0.02
(1.94) (1.68) (0.47) (Q.43)* (0.37) (0.09)
2.13 -1.93 NS 0.56 na
(1.24) (1.16) (0.30)
Source: Korea, see Data appendix
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Table 5—1 Labor Market Condition, Korea
ln(y(t)) = a0 + a1t + bln(x(t)) + cln(y(t—1)) + d(tJE(t))
y = (B, W); x = one of (PROF, VA, GDP, NS)
y x b c d
B PROF 0.32 0.65 —0.21
(0.26) (O.27)* (009)*
OT PROF 0.30 0.32 -0.16
(O.11)* (0.21) (O.06)*
WB PROF 0.23 0.65 -0.12
(Q.05)** (0.10)** (0.02)**
B VA 0.41 0.45 —0.11
(0.12)** (0.20)* (0.07)
OT VA 0.19 0.46 —0.16
(0.07)* (0.21) (0.06)*
WB VA 0.10 0.74 —0.12
(0.05) (0.15)** (0.03)**
B GDP 0.14 0.83 —0.23
(0.44) (0.27)* (0.11)
OT GDP 0.57 0.11 —0.07
(0.23)* (0.24) (0.07)
WB GDP 0.37 0.52 —0.08
(0.12)* (0.14)** (0.03)*
B NS 0.52 0.42 —0.17
(0.32) (0.34) (0.10)
OT NS 0.27 0.31 -0.16
(0.12)* (0.22) (0.06)*
WB NS 0.19 0.68 —0.13
(0.06)* (0.13)** (0.03)**
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Table 5—2 Pooling Regressions,
No year dummy, n=O
y x b
B VA 0.48
(0. 08) **
W VA 0.23
(0.03) **
(A-2) Test of the sectoral dummies = 0. H0: S = 0
F—statistics, F(8, 109)
y x=PROF VA NS
B 2.932** 3.847** 3.581**
W 1.842 2.596 2.849
(B) Sector—specific Intercepts and Elasticities
ln(y(t,j)) = a0 + a1*t + 4*s + b1*ln(x(t,j)) + cln(y(t—l)) +e(t,j)
b1 = sector—specific elasticities.
Tests of common intercepts and elasticities.
Null Hypothesis: Common intercepts and elasticities.
H0: d1=d2= ... =d8; b1=b2= ... =b8
F(16, 115)
y x=PROF VA NS
B 1.64 3.69** 4.85**
W 2.63** 3.21** 434**
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(A) Use of Sector and Year Dummy Variables
ln(y(t,j)) = a0 + d*s + n*v + bln(x(t,j)) + cln(y(t—l)) + e(t,j)
y(t,j) = compensation variable of year t, sector j: B or W.
x(t,j) = PROF, VA, or NS of year t, sector j.
4 = sector coefficient; n = year coefficient.
s = l' 2' 8) sector dummy variables.
V = (v1, v2, ... , v14), year dummy variables.
Hypothesis, no sectoral shift in B (or W) determination.
(A-l) Estimates and Standard Errors of b for various dummy
restrictions.
No restrictions
y x b
B VA 0.23
(0. 09)*
W VA 0.08
(0.03)*
No section dummy, 4=0
y x b
B VA 0.03
(0. 03)
W VA 0.00
(0. 01)
